This paper investigates the transparency of derivative disclosures of Australian firms in the extractive industries using 1998 to 2001 financial reports. The quality of financial reporting has become a major corporate governance issue since the collapse of prominent companies such as Enron in the United States, HIH Insurance in Australia, and, of particular relevance here, Barings PLC in the United Kingdom, where the losses were caused by derivative instruments. Disclosure transparency is an important component of the quality of financial reporting. We measure transparency based on a disclosure index developed from AASB 1033 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments. We examine the relationship between transparency and firm characteristics represented by size, performance, growth opportunities, auditor and type of extractive firm. The results indicate that the transparency of derivative disclosures among firms in the extractive industries has increased over the period. However, there is still evidence of non-compliance with the disclosure requirements, especially in relation to net fair value. We find that firm size, price-earnings ratio and debt-to-equity ratio, and to a lesser extent, market-to-book ratio and profitability are associated with disclosure transparency.
Introduction
This paper investigates the transparency of derivative disclosures of Australian firms in the extractive industries. 1 The quality of financial reporting has become a major corporate governance issue since the collapse of prominent companies such as Enron in the United States, HIH Insurance in Australia, and Barings PLC, the United Kingdom merchant bank. Of particular relevance here is the case of Barings PLC where the losses were caused by derivative instruments. Disclosure transparency is an important component of the quality of financial reporting. In this paper we explore the association between the transparency of derivative disclosures and various firm characteristics. We focus on the extractive industries as they extensively use derivative financial instruments to hedge their exploration and production risks (Berkman, Bradbury, Hancock, and Innes, 1997) . Concern about the risks attached to hedging 1 According to Deegan (2005) , extractive industries refer to firms which engage in the search for natural substances of commercial value such as minerals, oil and natural gas. instruments has forced accounting standard setters to promulgate rules for the disclosure and presentation of these instruments so that users are aware of their existence and therefore will be able to make more informed decisions.
We examine the transparency of derivative disclosure for a sample of publicly listed firms in the extractive industries for the period 1998 to 2001. We use a disclosure index based on five categories of information as required in AASB 1033 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments. 2 These categories are accounting policy, hedges of anticipated future transactions, risk information, net fair value information, and commodity contracts regarded as financial instruments.
The study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. We measure the transparency of 2 With the move to full harmonization in January 2005, Australia has now adopted AASB 132 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation and AASB 139 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement which are essentially identical to their international equivalents (IAS 32 and IAS 139 respectively).
derivative disclosures over a recent time period prior to the adoption of international accounting standards in Australia. Further, we examine the association between our measure of transparency and various firm characteristics. These characteristics are represented by size, performance, type of auditor, type of extractive firm, leverage and growth opportunities. While our study focuses on the Australian regulatory environment, it contributes to the international accounting literature by providing evidence on disclosure transparency in a setting where accounting standards are mandatory but compliance with those standards is not always rigidly enforced (Hope, 2003a) .
The results show that, while the transparency of derivative disclosures among firms in the extractive industries has increased, firms still use their discretion especially in relation to the disclosure of net fair value information. We find that larger firms and firms with high price-earnings ratios and debt to equity ratios provide more transparent derivative disclosures in their annual reports. We also find that performance, measured by profitability, and growth opportunities, measured by research and development and marketto-book value, are significant in some years but not in others.
The remaining sections of the paper are as follows. Section 2 explains the Australian reporting requirements relating to derivative financial instruments. Section 3 discusses prior research and develops the research questions examined in the study. Section 4 describes the sample selection, research design, and the variables. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes the paper.
Background: Derivatives and financial reporting
The relevant accounting standard relating to financial instruments in Australia at the time of this study was AASB 1033 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments. This standard was issued in 1996 3 and subsequently amended in 1999 to achieve greater harmonization with the international standard, IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation. 4 It followed the withdrawal of an exposure draft, ED59, which attempted to introduce recognition and measurement rules for financial instruments in addition to disclosure requirements. As a result of extensive lobbying against this exposure draft, the Australian standard setters decided to defer the recognition and measurement issue until an equivalent international standard was issued. 3 The standard was based on ED65 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments, which was issued in 1995. 4 Since AASB 1033 does not differ significantly from AASB 132, we refer to the relevant paragraphs of the former standard as this was current at the time of our study and formed the basis of our disclosure index.
Many derivative financial instruments are not recognized as assets and liabilities in the balance sheet and the unrealized gain or loss on these instruments is not recorded in the income statement. Therefore, firms are required to disclose information related to the instruments. This includes the objectives of holding or issuing derivative financial instruments (AASB 1033 paragraph 5.3). The disclosure is expected to help users to understand why entities use derivatives (by explaining the risks attached to the entity), and what they plan to achieve by the use of the derivatives. In addition, firms are required to disclose information about hedge activities, if they use financial instruments to manage risk associated with anticipated future transactions. 5 AASB 1033 paragraph 5.6 requires firms to disclose the net fair value of financial assets and liabilities, including unrecognised derivative financial instruments. The methods adopted and any significant assumptions made in determining net fair value must also be disclosed. Paragraph 5.7 requires more information when one or more financial assets are recognized at an amount in excess of their net fair value including the reasons for not reducing the carrying amount.
In addition to the above, firms are also required to disclose terms, conditions, and accounting policies adopted (paragraph 5.2), interest rate risk (paragraph 5.4), credit risk (paragraph 5.5), and commodity contracts which are regarded as financial instruments (paragraph 5.9). Two Australian studies on the transparency of derivative disclosure have been documented in Chalmers and Godfrey (2000) , and Chalmers (2001). Chalmers and Godfrey (2000) explore the disparity between the accounting treatment of derivative instruments encouraged by the 1996 version of AASB 1033 and firms' accounting practices based on the 1998 financial statements of Australia's largest 500 firms. This study extends previous survey research by identifying firms' derivative accounting policies and approaches to fair value determination. The study found that the quality of the disclosures was less than satisfactory, with the major weaknesses being:
The lack of accounting policy disclosures relating to specific types of instruments, and incompleteness in fair value disclosures.
Considerable variation in note disclosure both across firms and within firms, hindering 5 AASB 1033 paragraph 5.8 requires firms to disclose a description of the anticipated transactions and the hedging instruments used plus the amount of any deferred or unrecognized gain or loss and the expected timing of revenue or expense recognition. the understandability, comparability and consistency of derivative instruments information.
Limited variation in firms' derivative instruments accounting policies, with most sample firms employing hedge accounting techniques. The study also suggests that, while firms appeared to have accepted the requirement to make quantitative disclosures about the fair values of derivative instruments, these disclosures varied in detail and clarity. Chalmers (2001) examines Australian firms' derivative instrument disclosures over three phases, namely a pure voluntary disclosure phase, a coercive voluntary disclosure phase, and a mandatory disclosure phase. The study examines firms' responses to information demands in a changing regulatory environment from 1992 to 1998. Chalmers used a voluntary reporting disclosure index to capture derivative disclosures. The index was constructed using the disclosures suggested in the Australian Society of Corporate Treasurers' Industry Statement 6 and ED65: Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments. The results indicated that firms were responsive to quasi-contractual disclosure regulation since the number of firms registering a positive voluntary reporting disclosure index increased in each phase. The release of ED65, combined with the increased probability of the development of a standard, was found to be influential in achieving enhanced reporting of derivative instruments. 7 , no prior studies have identified the characteristics associated with the disclosure of derivative information. To develop our research questions, we therefore draw on prior research that has explored the quality of other disclosures in financial statements (Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989 Cooke, , 1991 Cooke, and 1992 Imhoff, 1992 ; Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995). These studies provide evidence on the association between corporate disclosure practices and firm characteristics such as size, leverage, profitability, 6 The industry statement was issued in March 1995 and requested firms to include derivatives information in their financial statements. 7 These studies have generally found that firm size, leverage and liquidity are associated with the use of derivatives.
listing status, external auditor, scope of business and industry type. Researchers use several theories to explain these characteristics. These theories include agency costs, political costs, proprietary costs, corporate governance and information asymmetry (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999) . Sengupta (1998) investigates the link between disclosure quality and cost of debt financing. This study indicates that firms with high disclosure quality ratings enjoy a lower effective interest cost of issuing debt. This is because timely and detailed disclosures may reduce the perception of default risk which leads to a lower cost of debt. The results indicate that disclosure quality is an important factor for lenders and underwriters in estimating a firm's default risk.
Size
Firm size is one of the characteristics that have been extensively related to disclosure policy. There are many reasons why large firms might disclose more information (Cooke 1991) . Singhvi and Desai (1971) , indicate that this is because these firms are expected to provide more transparent information since they incur lower cost of accumulating detailed information, they have more marketable securities and they have greater ease of financing. Cooke (1989) suggests that a further incentive for greater transparency is to reduce political costs. Cooke (1989 Cooke ( , 1991 , Firth (1979) This is due to the uncertainty or speculative nature of the industry, especially in the exploration phase.
In a no-liability company, shareholders are not legally liable to pay any calls, either while the company is a going concern or in its winding up (Ford, 1986) . Therefore it is expected that disclosure transparency may differ between noliability firms and limited liability firms. Further, noliability firms tend to be smaller firms, and, because they tend not to have reached the production phase, they are also less likely to be profitable. As a result, they may be reluctant to provide transparent information due to: a) the high cost of accumulating detailed information, b) the fact that they may feel that the disclosure could endanger their competitive position (Singhvi and Desai, 1971), and c) they are not subject to political costs (Cooke, 1989 
Auditor
Auditors play an important role in determining the transparency of information disclosed by their clients. Large audit firms tend to influence clients to provide high quality information so that their reputations are not diminished (Ali et al., 2003) . However empirical studies provide mixed results. Singhvi and Desai (1971), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) , and Wallace and Naser (1995) find that auditor size is positively associated with disclosure level but no significant association is documented in Firth (1979) . In these studies researchers employ either a weighted or a non-weighted index (Marston and Shrives, 1991). A weighted index requires the conduct of a survey so that financial statement users can rate disclosure items listed by the researchers. The unweighted index is less subjective than the weighted index. In this case, researchers adopt a dichotomous procedure where a score of one is given for disclosed items, and zero otherwise. Therefore the index assumes that each item of disclosure is equally important (Cooke, 1991) .
In this paper we develop an unweighted index for derivative disclosures to represent disclosure transparency based on the information in the financial statements and notes to the financial statements. Five categories of information are identified from AASB 1033. These are policy information, hedges of anticipated future transactions, risk information, net fair value information, and commodity contracts regarded as financial instruments. A score of one is given for each item based on the detailed information provided, both qualitative and quantitative, and a zero amount is allocated if firms failed to provide any information required. Table 1 documents the attributes of the disclosure index.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] To develop the index, we examine the notes to the financial statements. First, we examine the note containing the statement of accounting policies, where firms disclose the objectives for holding or issuing derivative financial instruments. In the event that firms fail to indicate their hedging behaviour in this note, we examine the note on financial instruments. We posit three possibilities with disclosures. The entities either: a) disclose that they hedge the risk internally or externally, b) disclose that they do not hedge, and c) disclose nothing about hedging. After identifying the hedge behaviour of firms, we then capture information about hedge disclosures and net fair values of financial assets, financial liabilities and derivative financial instruments. This information is disclosed in the note on financial instruments.
To make each component of the score add equally to the total score, we divide the component score by the number of items in that component. Therefore each component contributes a score of one to the total score of five. The transparency of derivative disclosure is measured by dividing the total score for each firm by the total possible score for a firm. For example, if a firm provides all information listed in Table 1 , the "disclosure transparency" of that firm is one (i.e, 5/5), and the firm is said to provide more transparent disclosures of derivative information. However, firms are not penalised if the information is not relevant to their situation i.e. the total score and total possible score are both reduced. The disclosure transparency is defined below:
firm's actual disclosure score (1) firm's total possible disclosure score
The association between the disclosure transparency of derivative information and firm characteristics
We examine the association between the disclosure transparency of derivative information and firm characteristics using the model specified in Equation
2
. TRANSPARENCY it = α 0 + α 1 SIZE it +α 2 PROFIT it + α 3 PE it +α 4 TYPE it +α 5 AUDIT it +α 6 MTB it + α 7 R&D it +α 8 DTE it + ε it, (2) Where: TRANSPARENCY = actual disclosure score/firm's total possible disclosure score SIZE = log of total assets PROFIT = earnings before tax/total assets PE = price/earnings before extraordinary items per share TYPE = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise AUDIT = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise MTB = market value/net book value of tangible assets for the given class of equity R&D = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. DTE = total liabilities divided by book value of common equity We define SIZE as the log of total assets. This is because the measure "total assets" is the least affected by market fluctuations in the oil and gas industry (Malone et al., 1993) . Because of the variability in the level of total assets between firms, we follow prior research and transform the size variable into its natural log in order to normalise the distribution. 8 High performance is measured by two variables: profitability (PROFIT) and price-earnings ratio (PE). The former measures current performance while the latter provides a measure of the market's perception of the firm's expected future performance. Whether the firm is a no-liability firm or a limited liability firm is indicated by TYPE, while AUDIT distinguishes between the use of a Big 5 (or Big 6) auditor and a smaller audit firm.
We also include three control variables that have been found in prior research to be associated with disclosure. We use two variables for growth opportunities. First, MTB measures the market value of the firm divided by the book value of tangible assets. This provides a measure of the market's perceptions of the value of the firm relative to assetsin-place, with a high value suggesting growth opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993). Second, we use a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm engages in research and development activities (R&D). R&D activities are an indication that the firm is likely to grow in the future (Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Percy, 2000; Clinch, 1991) .
The other control variable is leverage, which is represented by total liabilities to book value of common equity. Theory suggests that firms with high leverage are expected to reduce disclosure since the agency costs of debt are controlled through restrictive debt covenants rather than increased disclosure in financial reports (Jensen, 1986; Eng and Mak, 2003) . However, prior studies such as Hossain and Adams (1995) and Ali et al. (2003) provide evidence that leverage is not significantly associated with disclosure. Further, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) indicate that leverage is positively related to disclosure levels. Specific to the oil and gas industry, Malone et al. (1993) indicate that firms with high debt-to-equity ratios disclose greater financial information than firms with low debt-to-equity ratios.
Results

Sample
As at the end of 2001, there were 354 firms involved in the extractive industries listed on the ASX. We were unable to obtain the annual reports for 89 firms and these were eliminated from our sample. The sample was further reduced to 137 firms by excluding: a) foreign listed firms, b) newly listed/delisted firms, c) mining servicing firms, d) firms in receivership and e) firms with missing data. Table 2 summarises the sample selection procedure.
[INSERT Further investigation of each component reveals that some firms fail to disclose detailed information about the expected timing of recognition of any deferred or unrecognized gain or loss as revenue or expense, the aggregate net fair value, and the carrying amount and net fair value of either the individual asset or appropriate grouping of individual assets. Even though it is argued that fair value is relevant for users to assess the effect of derivative transactions (Rasch and Wilson, 1998), some firms appear to be unwilling to move to fair value accounting (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2000). We also find that firms do not disclose their reasons for not reducing the carrying amount to net fair value. As a consequence they do not provide any information about evidence for their belief that the carrying amount will be recovered.
[
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] Of concern, Panel B shows that the mean score for net fair value information is decreasing for limited liability firms. However, there is no consistent pattern in the trend for no-liability firms. We find that firms continue to use their discretion in the disclosure of certain information, in particular, net fair value information, even though this is required by AASB 1033. Therefore, as in Chalmers and Godfrey (2000) , this lack of disclosure may hinder the understandability, comparability, and consistency, and hence the transparency of derivative disclosures among firms in the extractive industries.
5.2.3.
Disclosure transparency of derivative information and firm characteristics Standard regression Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables in the firm characteristics model. Panel A shows that, for the dependent variable, the average transparency score is 88.71% for the pooled sample. Examining each year reveals that average transparency increases from 86.29% in 1998 to 90.23% in 2001. This indicates that the level of derivative disclosures among firms in the extractive industries has increased for each year. The level of dispersion across the period of study appears to be reducing, as indicated by the standard deviation which has reduced from 0.1137 in 1998 to 0.0772 in 2001.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] Panel A shows that there is little variability in the means for size, profitability, leverage (debt-to-equity ratio) and research and development over the period of study. The means of the price-earnings ratio and market-to-book ratio are more variable, with positive means in two years and negative in two years. The proportion of limited liability firms increases over the period from 58% to 66% while in all years more than 80% of firms use a Big Six auditor. Panel B indicates that, while the size variable is correlated with a number of other variables, only two coefficients exceed 0.60. This suggests that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. Table 8 presents the results of the regression analysis of the association between disclosure transparency and firm characteristics. 9 As predicted, firm size is positively related to disclosure transparency and is highly significant (p < 0.001). This indicates that large firms tend to provide more transparent information compared to small firms. Our finding is consistent with work undertaken by Singhvi and Desai (1971), Firth (1979) , Cooke (1989 Cooke ( , 1991 , Wallace et al. (1994) , Wallace and Naser (1995), Riahi-Belkaoui (2001) and Ali et al. (2003) . This finding is probably due to lower information processing costs for large firms but it is also possible that higher political costs incurred by these firms encourage greater transparency.
The coefficient estimates for profitability and price-earnings ratio are also positively significant (p = 0.0391 and p = 0.0406 respectively) but firm type and auditor are not significant. Two of the control variables, debt-toequity ratio and market-to-book ratio, are significant (p = 0.0212 and p = 0.0021 respectively). However, contrary to our expectation, market-to-book ratio is negatively related to the transparency of derivative information. The coefficient estimate for research and development is not significant. 10 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
Time might influence the behaviour of all variables, and therefore might affect the above results. The preceding analysis assumes that each firm-year can be treated as an independent observation. However the degrees of freedom in calculating the significance levels are overstated if the independent variables fail to remove autocorrelation in the dependent variable (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Therefore we repeat the regression analysis for each year and also using average data for the four years.
11
Results are reported in Table 9 , which indicates that size is only significant in 2000 and 2001 at p = 0.05 and p < 0.001, respectively. Size is also significant at p = 0.05 when we use average data. We also find that profitability is significant at p = 0.05 in 2000 and at p = 0.10 for average data. The significance of profitability may be due to the reaction towards the re-issuance of AASB 1033 in 1999. Since firms with high profitability may be subject to political costs and monitoring costs, they may provide more transparent information, especially immediately after the issuance of accounting pronouncements. However none of the variables are significant in 1998 and 1999 suggesting that the results in Table 10 might be influenced by particular years (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). 9 Since heteroscedasticity is present, we use White's Heteroscedasticity-Corrected Standard Errors (White, 1980) to estimate the model. 10 Our results are consistent when we estimate the model without the outliers. 11 Similar approaches were performed in Lang and Lundholm (1993). 12 Except for 1998, there is no heteroscedasticity present in year-by-year and average regression analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
Ranked regression
We repeat the regression analysis using the ranked regression procedure as in Lang and Lundholm Table 10 shows that the explanatory power of this model increases from 22.37% (Table 8 ) to 32.98%. Size, price-earnings ratio and debt-to-equity ratio are positively related to disclosure transparency and are highly significant at p < 0.001. 13 However, market-tobook ratio and profitability are not significant.
[ Table 11 shows the results of ranked regression for year-by-year and four-year average data. The table  indicates 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE]
Conclusion
In this study we examine the transparency of derivative disclosures of Australian firms in the extractive industries using 1998 to 2001 annual reports. The quality of financial reporting has become a major corporate governance issue in recent years and disclosure transparency is an important component of the quality of financial reporting. We measure disclosure transparency using an index developed from AASB 1033 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments. We then examine the relationship between disclosure transparency and firm characteristics, represented by size, performance, growth opportunities, auditor, type of extractive firm and leverage.
We find that the transparency of derivative disclosures among user firms has increased over the period of the study. However, companies in the extractive industries still use discretion in the disclosure of derivative information, especially in relation to net fair value. Our regression results 13 The results are based on the White's HeteroscedasticityConsistent Standard Errors, and are consistent with the results of estimation without the outliers. 14 We re-estimate the model without the outliers, and the results are consistent with the full sample for 1999 and 2001. relating to firm characteristics indicate that size, priceearnings ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio, and to a limited extent, market-to-book ratio, research and development and profitability, are associated with disclosure transparency.
Our results point to a lack of enforcement of accounting standards in Australia, consistent with the findings of Hope (2003a) . This is of concern in view of Australia's move to adopt international accounting standards as global harmonization will only be achieved if countries rigorously enforce standards.
Our study has a number of limitations. First, the findings could be biased since our sample is based on those companies that responded to our request for annual reports or that were included in the Connect 4 Annual Report Collection Database. Second, our sample of firms using derivatives is relatively small and this may have limited the power of our statistical tests. Lack of variability in our independent variables such as type of auditor may also have led to insignificant findings. These limitations provide opportunities for future research to further explore the association between firm characteristics and the transparency of derivative disclosures. In addition, exploring these issues in other industries and in other jurisdictions are fruitful avenues for further research. Accounting policies and method adopted Para 5.2 (a) 1 a) Extent and nature of the underlying financial instruments, b) including significant terms and conditions that may affect the amount, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows. Total  Status  1998 1999 2000 2001 1998 1999 2000 2001 1998 1999 2000  2001  User  38  40  43  43  27  25  22  22  65  65  65  65  Unknown  7  7  23  34  54  52  37  24  61  59  60  58  Non-user  1  1  5  6  10  12  7  8  11  13  12  14  Total  46  48  71  83  91  89  67  54  137  137 137 137 Note: Number in italic represents the t-value. ***, ** and * indicate significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10 respectively.
Variable Definitions: TRANSPARENCY = firm's actual disclosure scores/firm's total possible disclosure scores SIZE = log of total assets PROFIT = earnings before tax/total assets PE = price/earnings before extraordinary items per share TYPE = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise. AUDIT = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise MTB = market value/net book value of tangible assets for the given class of equity R&D = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. DTE = total liabilities divided by book value of common equity i = firm t = year p-value = 0.0000 *** indicates significance at p < 0.001.
Variable Definitions: RTRANSPARENCY = rank of disclosure transparency RSIZE = rank of total assets (in thousands) RPROFIT = rank of profitability RPE = rank of price/earnings ratio TYPE = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise. AUDIT = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise RMTB = rank of market-to-book ratio R&D = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. RDTE = rank of total liabilities divided by book value of common equity i = firm t = year Table 11 . Results of regression analysis of the association between disclosure transparency and firm characteristics: ranked transformation on a year-by-year basis and an average of four years' data (n=65)
RTRANSPARENCY it =α 0 +α 1 RSIZE it +α 2 RPROFIT it +α 3 RPE it +α 4 TYPE it +α 5 AUDIT it +α 6 RMTB it +α 7 R&D it +α 8 Note: Number in italic represents the t-value. ***, ** and * indicate significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10 respectively.
Variable Definitions: RTRANSPARENCY = rank of disclosure transparency RSIZE = rank of total assets (in thousands) RPROFIT = rank of profitability RPE = rank of price/earnings ratio TYPE = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise. AUDIT = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise RMTB = rank of market-to-book ratio R&D = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. RDTE = rank of total liabilities divided by book value of common equity i = firm t = year
